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Zionism and the Nakba: 
The Mainstream Narrative, the Oppressed Narratives, and the Israeli Collective Memory
MORI Mariko*
The Israelis call what happened in Palestine in 1948 “the War of Independence” (Milhemet 
ha-‘atzma’ut) whereas the Palestinians refer to it as “al-Nakba” (the catastrophe). The contrast 
between these two names is telling, for it reveals the presence of two conflicting memories 
of 1948, Jewish and Palestinian, which are not politically equal. While Israel has consistently 
justified the establishment of the Jewish state in its official narrative, it has rarely mentioned 
the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem and the destruction of over 400 Palestinian 
villages in 1948, thus deliberately denying Palestinian memories of the Nakba. Only in the 
late 1980s was this denial criticized and the rewriting of the 1948 history started by the 
New Historians, who dramatically shattered longstanding myths of the 1948 War and the 
Palestinian exodus.
Against this historical background, I try to explain how the Nakba has been addressed 
in the Israeli (Zionist) mainstream narrative in order to shed a light on the basic logic and 
assumptions underlying the mainstream narrative of the Palestinian exodus. I shall also 
explore the dissident narratives related to the Nakba, which have long been neglected due 
to their contradictions with the mainstream narrative, and reflect on the meaning of the new 
narratives from the late 1980s to the present.
1.  The Mainstream Narrative and the Myths of 1948
The Israeli mainstream narrative on 1948 can be summarized as follows: the Jews accepted 
the UN Partition Resolution on 29 November 1947, but the Arabs rejected it, demanding 
instead the establishment of an Arab state in all of Palestine. The Arabs further attacked the 
Jewish community in Palestine, which triggered a civil war. On 15 May 1948 the Arab states 
invaded Israel in an attempt to wipe out the new state. The Palestinians voluntarily “fled” their 
villages in accordance with orders given by the Arab armies, ignoring the Jewish call to them 
to stay put. There was no policy of expulsion on the Jewish side and the Palestinians became 
refugees of their own accord. The Arab states, furthermore, are responsible for perpetuating 
the refugee problem by refusing to absorb the refugees and by using the refugee problem for 
anti-Israel propaganda. Hence, Israel has no responsibility for the refugee problem, which is a 
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product of the Arab-initiated war of aggression.
This argument is directly challenged by the New Historians. Although not in agreement 
on all issues, the New Historians have presented a totally different picture based on their 
research into newly declassified Hebrew archives. According to the picture, the Jews accepted 
the UN Resolution only for tactical reasons and had no intention of accepting a small 
Jewish state. For the Zionist leadership, the 1948 War was a war for territorial expansion 
and Judaization of the new state, as well as for self-defense. During the 1948 War many 
Palestinians were expelled by the Jewish forces and did not abandon their villages voluntarily, 
although the question of whether or not a comprehensive policy of expulsion existed still 
remains highly controversial.
Bearing in mind the myths surrounding the mainstream narrative described above, I 
shall first analyze three aspects of this narrative: omissions and silence, indirect justification, 
and direct justification of what happened to the Palestinians in 1948. 
(1) Omissions and Silence 
Omissions and silence regarding the Nakba can be seen, for example, in official information 
pamphlets such as Facts about Israel. Quoting from its 1985 version, one finds a typical 
representation of the argument: 
Causes (of the War of Independence): Arab rejection of November 1947 UN 
Partition Plan gives rise to escalating attacks on Jewish community in Palestine […].
Responses: On 15 May 1948 the regular armies of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and 
Lebanon, and a Saudi Arabian contingent invade the new state […] IDF, although 
poorly armed and vastly outnumbered, repulse Arab assault.
Outcome: By July 1949 separate armistice agreements signed with Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Syria, based on cease-fire lines. Armistice agreements intended to 
facilitate transition to permanent peace [Facts about Israel 1985: 39].
In the 1992 version of Facts about Israel, one finds the following:
The number of Arabs in the country dropped, as nearly 600,000 had left during the 
War of Independence and only about 167,000 chose to stay or had returned under a 
family reunification program. With the arrival of a further 300,000 Jews from Arab 
countries over the next few years, a virtual exchange of populations was effected 
between Jews from Arab lands and Arabs from Israel [Facts about Israel 1992: 36].
Here we should note that the word “refugees” cannot be found and that the words “left” and 
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“a population exchange,” which suggest voluntary evacuation, are used instead. Thus, both 
versions present the typical mainstream narrative in that they omit any direct reference to the 
Palestinian refugees and to the Nakba.
This silence is also conspicuous in the discourse of the Zionist political elite. Yitzhak 
Rabin, for example, who was a commander of the Palmach during the 1948 War, does not 
mention in his memoirs the expulsion of the inhabitants of Lydda and Ramle in July 1948, 
in which he played a direct role [Rabin 1979].1 Similarly, Shimon Peres, who was one of the 
architects of the Yishuv settlement policy during the 1948 War, fails to mention the Nakba 
in his memoirs. Yet he does mention his 1992 visit to his hometown, Vishneva, Belorussia, 
and describes his experience of weeping in his innermost heart in front of his former house 
[Peres 1995: 42–43]. The contrast between his sensitive attitude toward the “European Jewish 
Nakba,” as it were, and his silence on the Palestinian Nakba is striking. 
In the writings of Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, former commanders of the 
Revisionist Zionist undergrounds, Irgun and Lehi, respectively, both men are exclusively 
concerned with the ideology and struggles of their own organizations and are totally 
indifferent to the Nakba (The Deir Yassin Massacre, for example, is justified by Begin, and 
not mentioned by Shamir). This also applies to Ariel Sharon, a Haganah commander during 
the 1948 War, who, in his autobiography, exclusively wrote about military operations [Begin 
1964; Shamir 1994: Ch. 3–4; Sharon and Chanoff 2001: Ch. 3–5].
Silence on the Nakba is also part of everyday life in Israel. Since the 1950s the 
depopulated Arab villages were bulldozed, new settlements built or existing ones expanded 
on the sites of those villages, and the names of places Hebraized. The Jewish National Fund 
(JNF) concealed the sites of the villages by planting forests on them or by turning them into 
natural parks for visitors and tourists. Since the JNF website and the information boards in 
the natural parks never mention the origin of the parks or the forests, ordinary Jewish families 
often picnic there without knowing the tragic history behind them. Not many people dare to 
ask the origin of the white debris scattered among the thriving grass. As Oz Shelach, a New-
York based Israeli novelist, describes: 
A Professor of history from Bayit va-Gan took his family for a picnic in a quiet 
pinewood near Giv’at Shaul, formerly known as Deir Yassin […]. The professor 
did not talk of the village, origin of the stones. He did not talk of the village school, 
now a psychiatric hospital, on the other side of the hill. He imagined that he and his 
family were having a picnic, unrelated to the village, enjoying its grounds outside 
1 In fact, a frank description of the episode was provided by Rabin, who stated in the original Hebrew 
version of his memoirs, Pinkas Sherut, that what had occurred in Lydda and Ramle had been an expulsion. 
The relevant passage was, however, excised by Israeli government censors [Morris 1994: 4].
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history [Shelach 2003: 1].
(2) Indirect Justification
In his voluminous memoirs translated into English entitled Israel: A Personal History,
David Ben-Gurion does not make any reference to Israeli atrocities in 1948 such as the 
Deir Yassin Massacre or the expulsion of 50,000 Arabs from Lydda and Ramle. Instead he 
depicts the Arabs solely as “victimizers” and “savage enemies” trying to wipe out the Jewish 
state, emphasizing the casualties and material damages that the Jews suffered in the Arab-
initiated “war of aggression.” Although it is briefly mentioned, the Palestinian exodus is 
naturally downplayed, mentioned simply as an outcome of the war [Ben-Gurion 1971: Ch. 2
–3]. Because of this the reality of great human suffering accompanying the Nakba and the 
victimizing acts of the Zionist forces never occur to the average English-speaking reader.
Basically, Ben-Gurion’s published diary in Hebrew of the 1948 War entitled Yoman 
ha-Milhamah has similar descriptions. A great part of this diary is devoted to daily 
developments and administrative details, with no reference to the Deir Yassin Massacre, and 
with only brief comments on the 30,000 refugees from Lydda and Ramle and on the plunder 
of these two towns by IDF soldiers [Ben-Gurion 1982: 347–348, 589]. It should be noted, 
however, that Ben-Gurion’s diary does include some highly significant and controversial 
statements made by him hinting at his policy of expulsion, to which I shall return. 
Though Ben-Gurion’s political opponent, Begin presents a similar narrative on the 1948 
War. In his memoirs, The Revolt, Begin shows his deep contempt for the Arabs and contrasts 
Irgun’s “heroism” with Arabs’ “cowardice” and “atrociousness.” He makes no reference to 
Irgun’s atrocities except the apologetic note regarding the Deir Yassin Massacre, thus leading 
its readers to draw the “logical” conclusion that, since the Arabs are “murderers,” they do not 
deserve sympathy for “fleeing” their homeland.
Interestingly, the Japanese translators of the above works by Ben-Gurion and Begin 
present strikingly contrasting views on the Israeli mainstream narrative in their preface and 
afterword. Kazuo Nakatani, Ben-Gurion’s translator and a journalist, says, while “the drama 
of the rebirth of Israel is the most moving story throughout modern history,” this book “is 
full of cruel pride that a victim has when he is about to turn into a victimizer” and points out 
“the deliberate omissions” in the book, the most glaring being the absence of any “reference 
to the treatment of the Palestinian refugees.” He therefore recommends reading related 
books written from an Arab viewpoint “in order to fill up the omissions and put things in 
perspective” (He further asserts that the “Jewish nation” has never existed, which shows that 
he was not free from prejudice against the Jews in the Arab world and parts of Europe).2 In 
contrast to Nakatani is Yoshito Takigawa, who translated Begin’s memoirs. Takigawa has 
2 Kazuo Nakatani, ‘Maegaki’ (Preface) to the Japanese version of Israel: A Personal History [Nakatani 
and Irisawa 1972: 7–8, 2].
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absorbed the Israeli mainstream narrative and criticizes the widespread “myth that the Jews 
ousted the Palestinians to establish the state […].”3
Thus, in Japan——a neutral country in terms of the Palestine Conflict——there have 
long existed two contrasting attitudes: one that uncritically accepts the Israeli mainstream 
narrative and another that challenges this narrative from an Arab perspective.
(3) Direct Justification
Direct justification is often accompanied by the following arguments: (a) the Palestinians 
“fled” of their own accord (the theory of voluntary evacuation), (b) the Palestinians, who 
initiated the war, and the Arab countries, which invaded Israel and refused to absorb the 
refugees, are both responsible for generating and perpetuating the refugee problem (the 
theory of Arab responsibility), or (c) the “population exchange” between Israel and the Arab 
countries in 1948 was effected by the Palestinian Arab exodus and the influx of Jewish 
immigrants from the Arab world (the theory of population exchange).
(a) The Theory of Voluntary Evacuation
According to this theory, the Palestinians voluntarily left their villages in accordance with 
orders given by the Arab armies, and ignored the Jewish calls for them not to evacuate. The 
most important implication of this theory is that there was no Jewish policy of expulsion. 
Here the word “fled” plays a key role in arousing the image of the Palestinians’ voluntarily 
abandoning their homeland. This theory was fully explained by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion 
and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett at a cabinet meeting on 16 June 1948 and shared by 
influential Israeli politicians regardless of their political views. As Shimon Peres, a former 
prime minister and a well-known Labor Party “dove,” wrote:
[…] Most of the Arabs living in the regions that passed to Israeli control fled 
their homes, even before the state established its various institutions and the 
Israel Defense Forces. Since that time, Israel and the Arab states have been 
at loggerheads over responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian Refugee 
problem. The Arab side claims that Israel is responsible, since it now holds the 
lands where these refugees lived before the war and since, they claim, Israel’s 
forces drove these people from their homes. On its part, Israel rejects this claim, 
and its spokespeople laid the responsibility on Arab leaders, since they called 
upon the inhabitants to leave the battle zones. Their vain hope was that they would 
quickly win the war, wipe Israel off the map, and let the local population return. 
3 YoshitoTakigawa, ‘Atogaki’ (Afterword) to the Japanese version of The Revolt [Takigawa 1989: vol.1, 
p.314]
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However, Arab luck did not hold: Israel won the war and the local inhabitants were 
left outside […]. [Peres and Naor 1993: 186]
In his book, A Place among the Nations, Benjamin Netanyahu, a former prime minister 
and the current Likud leader, also refuted “the idea that Israel expelled the refugees.” In 
1948, he asserted, the Palestinians left although “the Jews pleaded with their Palestinian Arab 
neighbors to stay,” as they did in Haifa, Tiberias, and other places [Netanyahu 1993: 142].
(b) The Theory of Arab Responsibility
Peres went on to blame the Arab countries for generating and perpetuating the refugee 
problem:
[…] Should Israel be held responsible for the fact that Arab countries did not 
absorb their Arab refugees in the same spirit of self-sacrifice and brotherhood that 
Israel displayed toward Jewish war refugees?
[…] As one who was close to Ben-Gurion and his generation of leaders, I know 
that he, as Prime Minister and Defense Minister during the War of Independence, 
never gave an order to expel people from their lands and homes. I have reason 
to believe that the Israel Defense Forces never had a “transfer” strategy. What 
transpired was the unplanned result of the tragic circumstances of the war, amid 
calls by Arab leaders to flee. About six hundred thousand Palestinians fled from 
Israel during the 1948 War of Independence, while we absorbed an equivalent 
number of Jewish refugees who fled here from the Arab countries […]. The Jewish 
refugees from Arab countries were immediately absorbed in Israel as full citizens 
with equal rights, while the Palestinian refugees were kept in refugee camps, and 
no state except Jordan granted them citizenship. 
The leaders of the Arab countries——a part from Jordan, under the leadership of 
King Hussein——have chosen to prolong the refugee problem for forty-six years, 
while repeatedly rejecting programs to rehabilitate the refugees in their temporary 
dwelling places. The reasons for this were that the countries involved feared 
disruption and the introduction of revolutionary ideas into their lands. They also 
sought to use the prolonged refugee problem as political capital in their struggle 
against Israel. The Palestinians paid——and continue to pay——the price, and 
have become a nation of refugees [Peres and Naor 1993: 186–187].
Interestingly, Peres’ criticism of the Arab states’ refusal to absorb the refugees was 
totally shared by the former Likud leader, Shamir, who formed the national unity government 
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with Peres in the 1980s. Meanwhile, Ben-Gurion, as early as the aforementioned cabinet 
meeting on 16 June 1948, stated, “We did not start the war. The Arabs attacked us in Jaffa, 
Haifa, etc.; and I do not want those who fled to return.” [Protocol of the Cabinet Meeting of 
16 June 1948] His emphasis on the Palestinians’ own responsibility is also shared by one of 
his disciples, Ariel Sharon. “They had become refugees in a war they themselves had made,” 
[Sharon and Chanoff 2001: 259] he later explained in his autobiography. 
(c) The Theory of Population Exchange
This theory is found, for instance, in the aforementioned 1992 version of Facts about Israel
(already quoted) and Netanyahu’s aforementioned book, A Place among the Nations. In 
this book Netanyahu argues: “There was, in fact, an even exchange of populations between 
the Arab and the Jewish states as a consequence of the Arabs’ war against Israel and their 
expulsion of the Jews from their lands.” Citing the examples of European population 
exchanges in the interwar period and the Indo-Pakistani de facto population exchange at the 
time of the separate independence of the two countries, he argued that, since Israel took in 
Jewish refugees from the Arab states, it is unjust for the Arab states to demand that Israel 
also resettle all the Arab refugees. “Such exchanges of population have occurred a number of 
other times this century: Millions of people were exchanged between Bulgaria and Greece in 
1919, between Greece and Turkey in 1923, between India and Pakistan in 1947, and so on. 
In none of these cases has anyone ever seriously suggested reversing the exchanges, let alone 
reversing only one side of them” [Netanyahu 1993: 228].
The origin and the historical background of the theory of population exchange will be 
examined later.
2.  Basic Assumptions Supporting the Mainstream Narrative 
There are several basic assumptions that have supported the mainstream narrative of the 
justification of the 1948 Palestinian exodus. These assumptions stemmed mainly from the 
Labor Zionist Movement from the Second Aliyah (1904–1914) onward, which faced the 
Arab majority in Palestine in the process of building the Yishuv and struggled for the creation 
of a Jewish majority and for the legitimate ownership of the country. Since the Jews were 
a minority, they desperately needed logic to justify Jewish ownership of Palestine and to 
deny, even if implicitly, Arab ownership. These assumptions are as follows: (1) “most of 
Palestine was uninhabited, uncultivated, barren wilderness, but the Jews cultivated and made 
it flourish”(the theory of “uninhibited, barren land”), (2) “the Palestinian Arabs are part of the 
greater Arab nation and lack their own nationalism”(the theory of “the greater Arab nation”), 
(3)“the Palestinian Arabs are rioters, pogromists, and enemies”(the theory of “rioters and 
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pogromists”), (4) “Jews returned to their homeland after 2000 years of exile”(the theory of 
the negation of Diaspora), and (5) “a population exchange/transfer is a justifiable, universal 
solution to minority questions”(the theory of the justification of population exchange /
transfer).
(1) The Theory of “Uninhabited, Barren Land”
Ben-Gurion, for instance, argued in 1919 that, since “the most part of the country is 
uninhabited and uncultivated,” it is a civilizational obligation for the Jews to reclaim that 
barren land and make it fertile. And, since even the already cultivated land was not sufficiently 
cultivated, Palestine was sure to have more economic potential. He went on to say that the 
Palestinian Arabs, who were unable to achieve this potential, were not, therefore, entitled to 
occupy Palestine alone [Ben-Gurion 1931: 150–151]. Aharon David Gordon, a spiritual leader 
of the Labor Movement, implied that the Jews had a greater right of ownership of Palestine, to 
the cultivation of which they were ready to devote their own labor. “The country will belong 
more to that side which is able, willing, to suffer and work for it the more […]. And here 
again you see the place of labor in our revival and redemption.”[Frankel 1981: 379–380] Thus 
the Labor leaders, either implicitly or explicitly, justified the Jewish acquisition of Palestine 
through “labor” and, thereby, as a corollary, denied Palestinian Arab ownership of Palestine.
(2) The Theory of “the Greater Arab Nation”
In his articles written in Russia as early as 1905 and 1906, Ber Borochov, one of the main 
architects of Socialist Zionism, pointed out the racial proximity of the Palestinian Arab 
peasants and the Jews, and the Palestinian inhabitants’ lack of homogeneity. Hence his 
prediction: “They [the Palestinian inhabitants] are not a nation and will not become one nation 
for a long time in the future”[Gorny 1987: 66–67].
This denial of Palestinian Arab nationalism was inherited by the Labor Movement 
and later passed on to the Israel Labor Party. Ben-Gurion argued in an article written during 
World War I that, since Palestinian Arab peasants were not Arabs but the descendants of 
ancient Hebrews, they had nothing to do with nationalism [Ben-Gurion 1931: 13–25, 30, 55
–56]. Influenced by Ben-Gurion, the Labor Movement in Palestine generally regarded the 
Palestinian Arabs as a people divided among effendis, workers, and peasants and as part of 
the greater Arab nation, thus lacking their own nationalism. This theory of “the greater Arab 
nation” enabled Zionists to avoid the moral dilemma of depriving the Palestinian Arabs of 
their only homeland, and led to the critical conclusion that “the Palestinian Arabs also have 
homelands outside Palestine.”
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(3) The Theory of “Rioters and Pogromists”
Not only the Revisionist Zionists led by Jabotinsky, but also the Labor Zionists led by Ben-
Gurion, constantly presented the anti-Zionist Palestinian Arab nationalists as “rioters” and 
“pogromists,” contrasting them with the Jewish “victims” suffering from “Arab pogroms.” 
Zionists, in general, tended to compare the situations in Russia and Eastern Europe to that in 
Palestine and downplay the anti-Zionist, nationalist actions of the Arabs simply as “pogroms.” 
The inhuman Palestinian Arab image presented by Zionists prepared them to justify the 1948 
exodus.
(4) The Theory of the Negation of Diaspora
Regardless of right and left affiliation, Zionists tend to emphasize the direct connection 
between ancient Judea and modern “Eretz Yisrael” (the Land of Israel) and negate the 2,000- 
year Diaspora (exile), which occurred between ancient and modern times. Exalting the heroes 
of Masada, who killed themselves after a heroic battle against the Roman Empire, and Bar-
Kochba, who also lost his life in a rebellion against Rome, Zionists have identified themselves 
with those ancient heroes and viewed the Jewish acquisition of “Eretz Yisrael” as a legitimate 
milestone on the road to the resurrection of their glorious national past [Zerubavel 1995: Ch.2, 
4, 5]. The negation of Diaspora which accompanies this discourse is deeply related to the 
historical context in which Zionism emerged as the antithesis of “Diaspora.” This negation 
has led to the Zionist blindness to the continuous presence of the Arabs in Palestine between 
ancient and modern times. The beautification of Masada and Bar-Kochba, which had already 
begun in the pre-state Yishuv, was incorporated into Israeli school education after 1948 
and has become a crucial part of the Israeli collective memory, playing a significant role in 
strengthening patriotism and in keeping the presence and exodus of the Palestinian Arabs 
entirely absent from the consciousness of ordinary Jewish citizens. 
(5) The Theory of “the Justification of Population Exchange/Transfer”
As mentioned above, population exchange is often cited in direct justification of the 1948 
exodus. The origin of the assumption that population exchange or transfer is a justifiable, 
universal solution can be found during the Mandate period. The idea of transferring the Arab 
inhabitants from Palestine to Transjordan or Iraq surfaced in the Zionist Movement as the 
Palestinian Arab national movement intensified against the backdrop of the mass influx of 
Jewish immigrants in the 1930s, with the prospect of the Jewish-Arab reconciliation gradually 
fading away. 
The Zionist transfer argument was not born out of vacuum. Since the end of the 
nineteenth century there had been a practice of Arab population transfers, albeit on a small 
scale: the Jewish settlers often transferred or ousted Palestinian Arab tenants from land 
98
Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 3-1 (Jully 2009)
purchased from absentee landlords. “Avodah Ivrit,” or “Hebrew Labor,” the practice of 
employing only Jewish workers, which formed the exclusivist movement of “Qibbush 
ha-Avodah,” or “the Conquer of Labor,” spread throughout Kibbutzim and urban Jewish 
workplaces in the 1920s and 1930s. The transfer argument was based on these undeniable 
daily realities of Jewish-Arab separation that rapidly crystallized in Mandatory Palestine. 
The transfer argument was also inseparably connected to the minority questions in 
Europe and the Middle East during the interwar period. After World War I, the Ottoman 
Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed, with many independent national states 
emerging in the former territories of these multinational empires. As a result, many minority 
questions were generated and became critical issues in international relations. It was against 
this backdrop that population exchange or transfer was widely advocated in Europe and 
carried out as an “efficient” solution to these questions.
In addition to this general international background, the Peel Commission Report of 
1937 particularly stimulated the Zionist transfer argument and brought it out into the open. 
This Report recommended to the British government the partition of Palestine into separate 
Jewish and Arab states and a population exchange between them based on the Greco-Turkish 
precedent of the 1920s, as a solution to the Palestine problem which had deteriorated because 
of the Arab Rebellion in 1936. From that time onward, Ben-Gurion’s statements strongly 
implied that the transfer of Arabs from Palestine was intended to make the country ethnically 
pure as well as to make room for Jewish immigrants. Thus, from the late 1930s to the 1940s, 
the Arab population transfer was justified on the basis of many precedents: the Greco-Turkish 
population exchange, the German minorities problem in the Baltic states and in the Sudeten 
region, the forced migration of the Volga Germans under the Stalin government, and the 
Hindu-Muslim de facto population exchange as a result of the separate independence of India 
and Pakistan in 1947. It should be noted that in June 1938 the consensus for “compulsory” 
transfer was reached within the Jewish Agency Executive, chaired by Ben-Gurion, despite 
the initial tendency of its members to advocate only “voluntary” transfer. This distinction 
between “voluntary” transfer and “compulsory” transfer widely accepted in the Zionist circle 
in the late 1930s is presumably the origin of the characteristic distinction still made in Israel 
between “voluntary” evacuation and “compulsory” evacuation in discussing the 1948 exodus.  
Not only being inspired by the precedents set in Europe and Asia, the Zionists were 
also supported by an international atmosphere that advocated population transfers. Against 
the backdrop of the Western sympathy toward the Jewish people aroused by the Holocaust, 
in 1944 the British Labour Party adopted a resolution that supported the transfer of the Arab 
population from Palestine, and in a public statement in July 1948, the then Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin mentioned population transfer as a “stable solution” to the Palestine problem 
[Masalha 1993: 157–161; Morris 2004: 39]. Furthermore, in 1945, former U.S. President 
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Herbert Hoover submitted to the White House a plan to transfer the Palestinian Arabs to Iraq. 
Even some Arab leaders unofficially supported transfer; among others, King Abdullah of 
Transjordan was interested in the partitioning of Palestine between Transjordan and a Jewish 
state, and backed a transfer in that context [Morris 2004: 57–58].
Among the figures who apparently played significant roles in incorporating the transfer/ 
population exchange argument into the Zionist mainstream narrative of the justification of 
the 1948 exodus are Yosef Weitz and Joseph Schechtman. The director of the JNF Land 
Department and deeply involved in the planning of transfers, Weitz is particularly known for 
his meticulously kept diary in Hebrew, which reveals a dark desire of the Zionist officials for 
an ethnically pure Jewish state [Weitz 1965].
Jabotinsky’s close associate and a historian, Schechtman was elected as a Revisionist 
representative to the Jewish Agency Executive in August 1948 and submitted to the Transfer 
Committee, which had already been set in motion under the Israeli government, a plan to 
transfer the Palestinian Arabs mainly to Iraq and to transfer Jews from the Arab countries 
to Israel. Interestingly, in his 1946 book entitled The European Population Transfers 1939–
1945, Schechtman analyzed in detail the transfers of German minorities during World War II 
from the South Tyrol, the Baltic states, the Soviet-incorporated Polish provinces, Bessarabia, 
northern Bukovina, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and other transfer precedents (the 
transfer of Swedes from Estonia, the population exchanges between Bulgaria and Rumania 
and between Hungary and Rumania, and so on), suggesting that such exchanges were the 
most realistic and effective solution to minority questions [Schechtman 1946]. He argued this, 
obviously with the eventual fate of the Palestinian Arabs in his mind. 
Furthermore, in his book entitled Population Transfers in Asia, which was published 
in 1949, when the Palestinian refugees had already been generated, Schechtman, citing the 
Hindu-Muslim population exchange involving more than 11 million people, the “repatriation” 
of the Armenian refugees to Soviet Armenia, and the transfer of the Assyrian minority in 
Iraq, examined in detail the economic and demographic capacity of the Arab countries to 
absorb the Palestinian refugees. Underlying these studies were the aforementioned theory of 
“greater Arab nation” and a strong desire for Jewish-Arab separation. This desire was clearly 
expressed in the following passage: “[…] since no constructive and peaceable solution of 
the Palestine problem can be achieved by either a Jewish State with an Arab minority or an 
Arab state with a Jewish minority, and since no mass transfer of Palestine’s 700,000 Jews to 
other countries is practicable, the only workable alternative remains an organized exchange of 
population between Palestine and the Arab states […]”[Schechtman 1949: 99]. Here one can 
clearly see Jabotinsky’s influence. Until his death in 1940, Jabotinsky had tried to justify the 
Jewish-Arab separation and the evacuation of the Palestinians by stressing the Jewish “tragic 
necessity” of having a homeland [Jabotinsky 1940: 220–223]. 
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Finally, in his 1952 book entitled The Arab Refugee Problem, he clearly pointed out that 
a population exchange could be expected between Iraqi Jews and the Palestinian refugees, 
while he dwelt on how Hindu and Muslim refugees were using properties abandoned by their 
former Muslim and Hindu owners, respectively, on the basis of the laws of both countries 
regarding abandoned properties. Citing this reality of the Indo-Pakistani population exchange 
and the laws of both countries regarding abandoned properties, Schechtman was obviously 
attempting to justify the Israeli act of forfeiting, on the basis of the equivalent law, the 
abandoned properties of the Palestinian refugees and allowing the Jewish immigrants to use 
them [Schechtman 1952: 91, 98–102]. By strongly advocating population exchange as a 
workable solution to minority problems, Schechtman contributed, in a significant way, to the 
shaping of the mainstream narrative of the justification of the 1948 exodus.
3.  The Shaping of the Mainstream Narrative
As early as April 1948, the Zionist leaders such as Ben-Gurion, Sharett, and Golda Meir 
regarded the evacuation of the refugees from Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa, and other places as a “far-
from-understandable phenomenon,” thereby emphasizing the unpredictability of the event. As 
a logical extension of this attitude, the view that the refugees voluntarily “fled” was to be fully 
expressed, almost for the first time in public, by the supreme political echelons of the State of 
Israel. At the aforementioned Cabinet meeting on 16 June 1948, where the highly important 
military and political issues were discussed, Sharett stated:
[…] I am particularly amazed by the flight of the Arabs. This is a more 
extraordinary episode in the annals of this country than the establishment of a 
Jewish state […]. This transformation has occurred in the course of a war initiated 
by the Arabs. Moreover, the Arabs fled; they were not driven out. This is one of 
those revolutionary events that alter the course of history. There can be no return to 
the status quo ante, just as there was no such return after the war between Turkey 
and Greece. […] Our compensation for Arab land and property can be used to 
resettle them in other countries. But they will not return. This is our State, and we 
will not allow that to happen […].4
Later, on various other occasions, Sharett would reiterate the same argument. In a speech 
before the Knesset on 19 March 1951, for instance, he mentioned “the Arabs who left the 
territory of Israel and abandoned their property there as a result of a war of aggression by the 
4 Cited in [Ben-Gurion 1971: 149].
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Arab world against our state.” A similar expression was found in his foreign policy statement 
in the Knesset on 4 November 1951. He said, “[…] it must be clearly understood that the 
problem of abandoned lands was a legacy of the war which was forced on Israel.”5 Thus, in 
retrospect, Sharett’s statement at the Cabinet meeting on 16 June 1948 may be regarded as 
one of the earliest official narratives that denied Israeli responsibility for the Nakba, for the 
reason that the refugees had not been driven out but had fled “in the course of a war initiated 
by the Arabs.” In a statement following that of Shertok at the above-mentioned Cabinet 
meeting, Ben-Gurion also strongly opposed the return of the refugees, saying:
[…] If war does begin again, we will be fighting for our lives. We cannot allow 
the Arabs to return to those places that they left. […] We did not start the war. The 
Arabs attacked us in Jaffa, Haifa, etc.: and I do not want those who fled to return 
[…]. While I oppose the return of the Arabs, I am for a pact with the Arab states 
after the war […].6
In retrospect, the Cabinet meeting of 16 June 1948, at which a consensus was reached 
concerning the blocking of the refugees’ return, marked a watershed in the formation of the 
mainstream narrative of the justification of the 1948 exodus, to which Israel was to hold fast 
both domestically and internationally. Supported by the aforementioned basic assumptions 
in the pre-state period, this narrative became a crucial part of the Israeli collective memory. 
As a powerful, convenient, and indispensable medium of justifying the establishment of their 
state, this narrative was embraced by, and became overwhelmingly dominant among, political 
elites, army officials, and the Jewish general public in Israel.
4.  The Dissident Narratives Related to the Nakba
I shall now deal with the dissident Zionist narratives which have long been ignored due to 
their divergence from, or disharmony with, the mainstream narrative. Interestingly, these 
dissident narratives often emerged from leading political figures such as Ben-Gurion, 
Sharett, and Dayan, the very architects of the mainstream narrative. Furthermore, some of the 
relatively easily accessible documents include elements that are significantly disharmonious 
with the accepted mainstream narrative. Curiously, these elements have often been overlooked 
by researchers. These facts themselves eloquently demonstrate the dominant power of the 
mainstream narrative and the difficulty of voicing dissident views in a predominantly Zionist 
social context.
5 Cited in [Schechtman 1946: 112, 110].
6 Cited in [Ben-Gurion 1971: 150–151].
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Dayan, a hero of the 1967 War, born and raised in the vicinity of an Arab village and 
well-versed in Arabic, once presented such a dissident narrative. In a 1969 lecture given at the 
Technion Institute of Technology, Haifa, he said:
Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the 
names of those Arab villages, and I do not blame you because geography books no 
longer exist. Not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either. 
Nahlal arose in the place of Mahlul; Kibbutz Gvat in the place of Jibta; Kibbutz 
Sarid in the place of Huneifis; and Kefar Yehushu’a in the place of Tal al-Shuman. 
There is not one single place built in this country that did not have a former Arab 
population [Ha-’aretz 1969 (Apr. 4)].
Dayan’s above narrative is idiosyncratic in that it presented the Palestinian, or dissident 
Jewish, memory of the Nakba. A candid recognition of the hitherto buried Palestinian 
memory, it obviously diverged from the mainstream Zionist narrative. It certainly drew public 
attention to the extent of being quoted in Ha-’aretz, one of the leading Israeli newspapers, but 
it did not have any real impact capable of changing the mainstream narrative. 
The Israeli collective memory and mainstream narrative regarding the 1948 exodus have 
oppressed and silenced dissident memories and narratives, Jewish or Palestinian, including 
Dayan’s. Let us look further into such dissident, therefore forgotten Zionist narratives both 
prior to and after 1948. Ben-Gurion in the 1920s, for example, advocated Jewish-Arab 
harmony through class solidarity and demanded that Zionism be ethical in its relations with 
the Arabs:
Eretz Yisrael is not a land without inhabitants. Within its boundaries […] live a 
little over one million inhabitants. On the west bank of the Jordan River alone live 
about 750, 000 inhabitants. We should not infringe on those inhabitants’ rights at 
any cost. Only dreamers like Zangwill believe that Eretz Yisrael will bring about 
a further right to oust non-Jews from the country. […] Even if we assume that this 
right is granted to us, the Jews have no authority or ability to exercise it. It is not 
desirable, nor feasible to expel the current inhabitants from the country. This is not 
an aim of Zionism[…] [Ben-Gurion 1931: 131–132].
This narrative is dissident in that it contradicts the assumption supporting the mainstream 
narrative that “most of Palestine was uninhabited.” Also strikingly dissident is Ben-Gurion’s 
recognition of the Palestinian national movement immediately after the 1929 Arab Riots: 
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[…] if we judge the Arabs and their movement with our own yardstick, we will be 
wrong. Every nation has its own suitable national movement. The clear sign of a 
political movement is that it knows how it gathers the masses around itself. From 
this point of view, there is no doubt that a political movement is just in front of us. 
So, let us not downplay it [Ben-Gurion 1931: 180].
This recognition was deepened by the 1936 Arab Rebellion:
I want to destroy first of all the illusion among our comrades that the [Arab] terror 
is a matter of a few gangs, financed from abroad […]. We are facing not terror but 
a war. It is a national war declared upon us by the Arabs […]. This is an active 
resistance by the Palestinians to what they regard as a usurpation of their homeland 
by the Jews——that is why they fight. Behind the terrorists is a movement, which 
though primitive is not devoid of idealism and self-sacrifice […]. In our political 
argument abroad, we minimize Arab opposition to us. But let us not ignore the 
truth among ourselves […] (Mapai Political Committee, 1938).7
Both of these statements contradict the assumption supporting the mainstream narrative that 
“the Palestinians are part of the greater Arab nation and do not have their own nationalism.” 
The most heretical, but unknown narrative presented by Ben-Gurion, however, may 
be his “Palestine Federation Plan,” which he submitted to his party soon after the 1929 
Arab Riots. This detailed plan was intended to bring about Jewish-Arab coexistence in one 
federation based on territorial and cultural autonomies [Ben-Gurion 1931: 189–196], but 
was vehemently opposed by his party, Mapai, and shelved in 1930. The plan was quickly 
pushed into oblivion partly because it contradicted the assumption supporting the mainstream 
narrative that “the Palestinians are rioters and enemies” let alone political partners.  
Ben-Gurion abandoned his effort to achieve Jewish-Arab coexistence in the 1930s 
and apparently reached, by the end of the 1930s, a conclusion that the Jews should expel 
the Palestinians. A letter to his son, Amos, in October 1937 reveals his desire for expulsion 
[Ben-Gurion 1974: 331], which seemed to turn into a policy of expulsion in 1948. During 
the Party Council of February 1948, after expressing his satisfaction with the Judaization 
of Western Jerusalem, he predicted: “What happened in Jerusalem or Haifa is likely to 
happen in many parts of this country […]. After the battles of 6, 8, or 10 months […] the 
demographic composition of this country will change greatly”[Ben-Gurion 1981: 210–211]. 
Even this statement, which is found in his aforementioned War Diary, seemed to have long 
7 Cited in [Flapan 1979: 141–142].
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been unheeded, presumably because it came to be regarded as dangerous to the mainstream 
narrative that “there was no policy of expulsion.” 
All this also applies to Sharett, who grew in the vicinity of an Arab village and was 
well-versed in the Arab language and culture. Charged with negotiating with the Arabs as the 
director of the Jewish Agency Political Department, he clearly foresaw the human suffering 
that the establishment of a Jewish state would inevitably inflict on the Palestinians. He even 
predicted unprecedented bloodshed during the process of transferring the Palestinians.8 Not 
only his insights into the human suffering of the Palestinians, but also his “radical” ideas 
concerning the Palestinians during the Lausanne Conference in 1949, failed to find a place 
in the mainstream narrative. Strongly pressured by the Americans, Sharett proposed to the 
Palestine Conciliation Committee (PCC) that Israel accept 100,000 refugees under certain 
conditions and he even considered the possibility of a Palestinian State on the West Bank. 
Both of the ideas were, however, aborted for differing reasons. These options offered by 
Sharett were never mentioned in the memoirs of the Israeli politicians, obviously because they 
diverged from the mainstream narrative that “Israel was not responsible for the refugees, who 
voluntarily fled in a war of aggression initiated by the Arabs.” Sharett himself, who in 1950s 
clashed with Ben-Gurion over policy toward the Arabs and was eventually ousted from the 
government, was ignored by the mainstream narrative and deliberately pushed into oblivion in 
the Israeli collective memory. 
Other important dissident narratives came from Mapam, the leftist wing of the Labor 
Movement and one of the governing parties during the 1948 War. Comprising the Ha-shomer 
Ha-zair people, who had long advocated bi-nationalism, Mapam played a significant role in 
criticizing Israeli expulsions and atrocities during the war. The Mapam leaders, however, 
gradually reconciled themselves, in the period between 1947 and 1949, with the Jewish 
occupation and development of the abandoned Arab lands, due initially to the emergencies 
caused by the war and due later to the necessity of absorbing Jewish immigrants and of 
agricultural development. This change in Mapam went hand in hand with the process under 
which the memory of the Nakba was oppressed in the Israeli collective memory. Meanwhile, 
as the prestige of the Kibbutzim heightened because of their wartime roles in heroic defense 
and the border demarcation of the emerging state [Near 1997: 161, 166], their exclusivist role 
in expelling the Palestinians was steadily forgotten in the Israeli collective memory.     
5.  The New Narratives from the 1980s Onward
Against the backdrop of soul-searching in the wake of the Lebanon War and the 
8 See, for example, his statement at the Mapai Central Committee, 5–6 February 1937 (cited in [Ben-
Gurion 1974: 67–68]).
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declassification of official documents, the New Historians began the rewriting of the history 
of 1948. In this last section I shall just briefly discuss the meaning and the prospects of the 
new narratives on the 1948 exodus, which emerged from the 1980s onward.
The research that the New Historians carried out into newly declassified documents 
shattered many myths about the 1948 exodus and seriously challenged the mainstream 
narrative, with dissident, hitherto oppressed Jewish and Palestinian narratives and memories 
surfacing to claim their deserved status. Benny Morris, who was at the center of the new 
narratives, followed a very interesting process. He concluded that there was no premeditated, 
comprehensive policy of expulsion.9 Although this conclusion was in harmony with the 
official narrative, it essentially contradicted his own findings. He could be an example of 
a Zionist academic who tries hard to reconcile his conclusions with the old mainstream 
narrative despite the fact that they seriously conflict with his academic findings. Moreover, as 
Morris’ interview by Ha-’aretz on 9 January 2004 revealed, his real stance proved to be more 
radical; he justified the “ethnic cleansing” in 1948 and said that if Ben-Gurion “had carried 
out a full expulsion rather than a partial one, he would have stabilized the State of Israel for 
generations”[Shavit 2004 (Jan.9)].
Morris’ outright justification of the ethnic cleansing of 1948 may be viewed as part of 
a general picture in which the hitherto oppressed narrative, which had been marginalized as 
one of extremists, violently erupted against the backdrop of the newly intensified Palestinian 
Conflict from 2000 onward. Meanwhile, there emerged another diametrically opposed 
narrative that also acknowledges the ethnic cleansing of 1948 but demands that Israel take 
moral responsibility for perpetrating it. This narrative, strongly presented by Ilan Pappe and 
others, is certainly groundbreaking compared to the Israeli mainstream narrative, which 
denies Israeli responsibility for the Nakba.10 We should note, however, that this narrative also 
has its shortcomings. It tends to oppress positive memories about the Zionists’ search for 
coexistence——mainly through socialism——and their deep moral dilemma, which did exist, 
even if without any fruitful results, in the 1920s and 1930s [Mori 2002: Ch. 2–3].
The monolithic Israeli collective memory shaped by the mainstream narrative is now 
waning and being replaced by multiple Jewish and Palestinian memories, a phenomenon 
which marks a turning point in the Israeli perception of the Nakba. Shattering the myths 
about the Palestinian exodus and recognizing the legitimacy of hitherto silenced Palestinian 
narratives are certainly significant steps forward in the reconciliation of the two peoples. To 
look at it from a different angle, such awareness of the deliberate obliteration of the memories 
9 See, for example, [Morris 2004: 588]. Here one can see that the conclusion reached by Morris in the 
old version of this book, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem (published in 1987)[Morris 1987], 
remains basically unchanged.
10 See, for example, [Pappe 2006].
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of the Palestinian villages as is shown, for instance, by the writer Oz Shelach and the Israeli 
grassroots organization “Zochrot” deserves note, as a yardstick for gauging whether the nation 
is mature enough to view the dark sides of its history in the correct perspective. It is yet to be 
seen, however, if the current chaotic situation after the opening of “Pandora’s Box,” with the 
apparently unbridgeable rupture between those who justify the ethnic cleansing of 1948 and 
those who emphasize Israeli moral responsibility for the ethnic cleansing but deny their own 
positive memories, will really be conducive to a genuine, long-enduring reconciliation and a 
constructive future.
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